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Abstract: In this research article, we explore the use of a design process for adapting existing 
cyber risk assessment standards to allow the calculation of economic impact from IoT cyber 
risk. The paper presents a new model that includes a design process with new risk assessment 
vectors, specific for IoT cyber risk. To design new risk assessment vectors for IoT, the study 
applied a range of methodologies, including literature review, empirical study and 
comparative study, followed by theoretical analysis and grounded theory. An epistemological 
framework emerges from applying the constructivist grounded theory methodology to draw 
on knowledge from existing cyber risk frameworks, models and methodologies. This 
framework presents the current gaps in cyber risk standards and policies, and defines the 
design principles of future cyber risk impact assessment. The core contribution of the article 
therefore, being the presentation of a new model for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk.  
Keywords: Cyber risk; Internet of Things cyber risk; Internet of Things risk vectors; 
Standardisation of cyber risk assessment; Economic impact assessment. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a strong interest in industry and academia to standardise existing cyber risk 
assessment standards. Standardisation of cyber security frameworks, models and 
methodologies is an attempt to combine existing standards. This has not been done until 
present. Standardisation in this article refers to the compounding of knowledge to advance 
the efforts on integrating cyber risk standards and governance, and to offer a better 
understanding of cyber risk assessments. Here we combine literature analysis (Ezell et al., 
2010) with epistemological analysis, and an empirical (Davis, Garcia and Zhang, 2009) with 
a comparative study (Ganin et al., 2017). The empirical study is conducted with fifteen 
national high-technology (high-tech) strategies, seven cyber risk frameworks and two cyber 
risk models. The comparative study engages with fifteen high-tech national strategies. The 
epistemological analysis and an empirical study seek to probe the current understanding of 
cyber risk impact assessment.  
To adapt the current cyber security standards, firstly the specific IoT cyber risk vectors need 
to be identified. By risk vectors, we refer to Internet of Things (IoT) attack vectors from 
particular approach used, to exploit big data vulnerabilities (Choi and Lambert, 2017). 
Subsequently, these specific risk vectors need to be integrated in a holistic cyber risk impact 
assessment model (Gisladottir et al., 2017). 
documented process represents a new design for mapping and optimising IoT cyber security 
and assessing its associated impact. We discuss and expand on these further in the remainder 
of this article. The research article is structured in the following format. In Section 2 we 
present the research methodology. In Section 3 we conduct literature review. In section 4 we 
propose the IoT cyber risk vectors by conducting a comparative study of national high-tech 
strategies and initiatives. In section 5 we propose the design principles for impact assessment 
of IoT cyber risk by conducting empirical study cyber security frameworks, methods and 
quantitative models. In Section 6 we evaluate the design principles by conducting theoretical 
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analysis to uncover the best method to define a unified cyber risk assessment. In section 7 we 
propose a new epistemological framework for cyber risk assessment standardisation and we 
discuss the new impact assessment principles. In Section 8 we present the conclusions and 
limitations of the research.  
2 METHODOLOGY  
The methods applied in this study consist of literature review, comparative study, empirical 
analysis, theoretical and epistemological analysis and case study workshops. The selection of 
methodologies is based on their flexibility to be applied simultaneously to analyse the same 
research topic from different perspectives. We use practical studies of major projects in the 
I4.0 to showcase recent developments of IoT systems in the context of I4.0 high-tech 
strategies. We need practical studies to bridge the gaps, to assess the impact and overcome 
some of the cyber risk limitations and to construct the relationship between IoT and high-tech 
strategies. The proposed design principles support the process of building a holistic IoT cyber 
risk impact assessment model. 
2.1 Theoretical analysis  
The methodology applies theoretical analysis through logical discourse of knowledge, also 
known as epistemological analysis. An epistemological analysis enables an investigation on 
how existing knowledge is justified and what makes justified beliefs justified (Steup, 2005), 
what does it mean to say that we understand something (Wenning, 2009) and how do we 
understand that we understand.  
The methodology reported here has two objectives. The first objective is to enable an up-to-
date overview of existing and emerging cyber risk vectors from IoT advancements, which 
includes cyber-physical systems, the industrial Internet of things, cloud computing and 
cognitive computing (MEICA, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015; Liao et al., 2017). If we were 
performing a vector specific analysis of risk for the Internet of Things, we would include 
University of Oxford 
 4 
examining risk vectors related to consumer IoT and specific high-risk verticals like eHealth 
and Smart Cities. But this study is focused on the developing an economic impact assessment 
of IoT cyber risk as a component in the context of other emerging technologies. This 
methodological approach proposes a new design for assessing the impact of cyber risk and 
promotes the adaptation of existing cyber risk frameworks, models and methodologies. The 
second objective is to enable the adaptation of the best cyber security practices and standards 
to include cyber risk from IoT vectors.  
The methodology begins with an academic and industry literature review on IoT cyber risk. 
A comparative study (Ganin et al., 2017) classifies the cyber risk vectors, specific to the IoT, 
based on the current technological trends. An empirical study (Davis, Garcia and Zhang, 
2009) categorises cyber risk frameworks, methodologies, systems, and models (particularly 
those that are quantitative). Afterwards, the compounded findings are compared with the 
existing standards through a grounded theory assessment method. This is followed by a 
theoretical analysis to uncover the best method to define a unified cyber risk assessment. The 
objective of the methodology is to synthesise and to build upon knowledge from existing 
cyber risk standards.  
3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Literature review of academic and industry literature from several different countries is 
undertaken to advance the epistemological framework into a design model. 
3.1 Recent literature on this subject 
The increasing number of high-impact cyber-attacks has raised concerns of the economic 
impact (Andrijcic and Horowitz, 2006; Santos, Haimes and Lian, 2007; Henry and Haimes, 
2009; Haimes, 2018) and the issues from quantifying cyber insurance (Malhotra, 2017). This 
triggers questions on our ability to measure the impact of cyber risk (Nurse, Creese and De 
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Roure, 2017; Nurse et al., 2018; P. Radanliev, C. D. De Roure, et al., 2018; P. Radanliev, D. 
De Roure, et al., 2018). The literature review is focused on defining the IoT risk vectors 
which are often overlooked by cyber security experts. The IoT risk vectors are investigated in 
the context of Social Internet of Things (Atzori et al., 2012), the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) and the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). In the Social Internet of Things, the IoT is autonomously 
establishing social relationships with other objects, and a social network of objects and 
humans is created (Ortiz et al., 2014; Hussein et al., 2017). The I4.0 is also known as the 
fourth industrial revolution and brings new operational risk for connected digital cyber 
networks (Peasley et al., 2017). Finally, the IIoT represents the use of IoT technologies in 
manufacturing (IIC, 2017).  
3.1.1 Cyber risk in shared infrastructure from autonomous IoT  
The cyber risk challenges (Paté-Cornell et al., 2018) from IoT technological concepts, mostly 
evolve around the design and the potential economic impact (loss) from cyber-attacks (Petar 
Radanliev et al., 2018; Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure, J. R. C. Nurse, Burnap, 
Anthi, et al., 2019c). IoT revolves around machine-to-machine (Wan et al., 2013; 
Stojmenovic, 2014) and cyber-physical systems (CPS) (Drath and Horch, 2014). Similarly, 
the IoT is based on intelligent manufacturing equipment (Lee, Bagheri and Kao, 2015; 
Posada et al., 2015; Shafiq et al., 2015; Leitão, Colombo and Karnouskos, 2016; Marwedel 
and Engel, 2016), creating systems of machines capable of interacting with the physical 
world (Lewis and Brigder, 2004; Leonard, 2008; Wang, 2013; Rutter, 2015; Brettel et al., 
2016; Carruthers, 2016; Marwedel and Engel, 2016). The IoT requires: software defined 
networks (Kirkpatrick, 2013); software defined storage (Ouyang et al., 2014); protocols and 
cloud hosting (Carruthers, 2016); artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (Wan et 
al., 2013; Kambatla et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2015; Shafiq et al., 2015); and mesh networks for 
peer-to-peer connectivity (Wark et al., 2007). The integration of such technologies creates 
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new cyber risk, for example from integrating less secured systems (Carruthers, 2016). 
Incorporating the cyber element in manufacturing, for instance, also bring an inherent cyber 
risk (DiMase et al., 2015). There are multiple attempts in literature where existing models are 
applied understand the economic impact of cyber risk (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Rodewald 
and Gus, 2005; Anderson and Moore, 2006; Santos, Haimes and Lian, 2007; World 
Economic Forum, 2015; Koch and Rodosek, 2016; Roumani et al., 2016; Ruan, 2017). 
However, these calculations largely ignore the cyber risk of sharing infrastructure (DiMase et 
al., 2015), such as IoT infrastructure (Nurse et al., 2018; Taylor, P., Allpress, S., Carr, M., 
Lupu, E., Norton, J., Smith et al., 2018; P. Radanliev, C. D. De Roure, et al., 2018; P. 
Radanliev, D. De Roure, et al., 2018; P. Radanliev et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, David 
Charles De Roure, J. R. C. Nurse, Montalvo and Burnap, 2019a; Petar Radanliev, David 
Charles De Roure, J. R. C. Nurse, Montalvo, Burnap, et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, Charles 
De Roure, et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, D. De Roure, et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, David 
Charles De Roure, J. R. C. C. Nurse, et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure, 
J. R. C. Nurse, Burnap, Anthi, et al., 2019c, 2019a, 2019b). Understanding the shared risk is 
vital for risk assessment (Rajkumar et al., 2010; Zhu, Rieger and Basar, 2011; Koch and 
Rodosek, 2016; Ruan, 2017), but the cyber risk estimated loss range can vary significantly 
(Biener, Eling and Wirfs, 2014; DiMase et al., 2015; Koch and Rodosek, 2016; Shackelford, 
2016; Ruan, 2017). Furthermore, there is no direct correlation between cyber ranking (Allen 
and Hamilton, 2014) and digital infrastructure (Allen and Hamilton, 2014), thus contradicting 
the argument that cyber risk is related to integrating new technologies (Marwedel and Engel, 
2016). It seems more likely that the cyber challenges are caused by the adoption and 
implementation cost of smart manufacturing technologies (Anderson, 2016).  
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3.1.2 Cyber risk and IoT cloud technologies 
If the Cloud architecture is properly engineered, the security of the cloud instance is 
adequately maintained and the connectivity from cloud to Thing can be assured, then cyber 
risks can be reduced with cloud technologies (Ribeiro, Barata and Ferreira, 
2010)(Thramboulidis, 2015)(Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016)(Shafiq et al., 
2015)(Wahlster et al., 2013). To ensure cyber risk is reduced, cloud technologies should be 
supported with: internet-based system, service platforms (La and Kim, 2010; Dillon et al., 
2011; Wahlster et al., 2013; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015), processes, 
services (Stock and Seliger, 2016; Hussain, 2017)(Brettel et al., 2016; Hermann, Pentek and 
Otto, 2016; Wang et al., 2016), for machine decision making (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; 
Wang, 2013)(Wahlster et al., 2013; Shafiq et al., 2015). Creating cyber service architecture 
(La and Kim, 2010; Wang, Törngren and Onori, 2015; Weyer et al., 2015) and cloud 
distributed manufacturing planning (Wang, 2013; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015)(Faller and 
Feldmüller, 2015; Posada et al., 2015).  Cyber risk mitigation also require compiling of data, 
processes, devices and systems (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Shafiq et al., 2015), 
connection to model-driven systems (Jensen, Chang and Lee, 2011; Shi et al., 2011; Wang et 
al., 2014), and model-based platforms (Stojmenovic, 2014; Ringert, Rumpe and Wortmann, 
2015), for cyber manufacturing (Wahlster et al., 2013; Lee, Kao and Yang, 2014; Bauer et 
al., 2015; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015). IoT technologies need to be supported with a life cycle 
process for updating the list of assets that are added to the network across multiple time-
scales (Benveniste, 2010; Benveniste, Bouillard and Caspi, 2010; Sokolov and Ivanov, 2015). 
IoT cyber risk is also present in components modified to enable a disruption (Evans and 
Annunziata, 2012; DiMase et al., 2015). One option by which such risk could be mitigated is 
to consider the standardisation of the IoT design and process (Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, 
Damm and Passerone, 2012; Ruan, 2017); unfortunately however, such system security is 
complex (Lu et al., 2013; Ganin et al., 2017; Woods et al., 2017; Haimes, 2018) and risk 
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assessing IoT systems is still a key problem in research (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017). 
Nevertheless, cyber networks need to be secure, vigilant, resilient and fully integrated 
(Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016)(Waslo et al., 2017)(Bhave et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
IoT need to encompass the security and privacy (Zhu, Rieger and Basar, 2011), along with 
electronic and physical security of real-time data (Niggemann et al., 2015; Almeida, Santos 
and Oliveira, 2016).  
The IoT consists of heterogeneous cloud technologies and varying lifecycle of the IoT 
devices, the question of value (Nicolescu et al., 2018a, 2018b; Taylor, P., Allpress, S., Carr, 
M., Lupu, E., Norton, J., Smith et al., 2018) in inheriting outdated data (Tan, Goddard and 
Pérez, 2008; Ruffle et al., 2014; Ruan, 2017) where machines store knowledge and create a 
virtual living representation in the cloud (Drath and Horch, 2014). The access to existing 
knowledge could be of value to design more resilient systems and processes in the future. 
3.1.3 Cyber risk from social machines and real-time technologies 
Cyber risk emerges from the Web, but also from any interface to a digital processing 
component, wired and wireless and the entire Web can be perceived as a social machine (Hall 
and Tiropanis, 2012). The term social machines in the context of this paper is used in relation 
to systems that depend on interaction between humans and technology and enable real time 
output or action, such as Facebook and Twitter. Social machines (Giordano, Spezzano and 
Vinci, 2016) are vulnerable to cyber risks, because of the connection between physical and 
human networks (Evans and Annunziata, 2012; Marwedel and Engel, 2016), operating as 
systems of systems (Wang, Törngren and Onori, 2015; Leitão, Colombo and Karnouskos, 
2016), and mechanisms for real-time feedback (Tan, Goddard and Pérez, 2008; Shi et al., 
2011; Kang, Kapitanova and Son, 2012; Marwedel and Engel, 2016). Cyber risk from real-
time IoT technology (Hermann, Pentek and Otto, 2016) requires information security for data 
in transit (Longstaff and Haimes, 2002; DiMase et al., 2015; Toro, Barandiaran and Posada, 
University of Oxford 
 9 
2015). In addition, access control is required for granting or denying requests for information 
and processing services (Rajkumar et al., 2010; Evans and Annunziata, 2012; DiMase et al., 
2015). Despite expectations that information security and access control for social machines 
exists, the business of personal data has triggered many privacy concerns for social machines 
such as Facebook and Google (Esteve, 2017). Some of these concerns have already 
materialised (Arnold and Teppler, 2018; Hindman, 2018). IoT brings inherent cyber risks 
which require appropriate cyber recovery plans. The relationship between IoT cyber risk 
assessment and recovery planning emerges from new processes, such as machine learning, 
that can be used to patch known vulnerabilities in real-time.  
3.2 IoT cyber risk vectors from the literature review 
The IoT cyber risk vectors relate to the overall aim of defining the design principles for cyber 
risk impact assessment. Prior to assessing the impact, we required an understanding of the 
IoT risk.  The reality of assessing security risks in Internet of Things systems is that ‘If you 
can’t understand it, you can’t properly assess it!’(Nurse et al., 2018).  
A list of IoT cyber risk vectors derive from the literature review.  
• The cloud technologies enhance cyber security but amplify IoT cyber risk  (Ribeiro, 
Barata and Ferreira, 2010; Wahlster et al., 2013; Shafiq et al., 2015; Thramboulidis, 
2015; Giordano, Spezzano and Vinci, 2016). 
• IoT depends on real-time data, but real-time data amplifies IoT cyber risk 
(Niggemann et al., 2015; Almeida, Santos and Oliveira, 2016). 
• IoT cyber risk mitigation needs autonomous cognition, but autonomous machine 
decisions amplify IoT cyber risk (Kolberg and Zühlke, 2015; Lee, Bagheri and Kao, 
2015; Toro, Barandiaran and Posada, 2015; Wan, Cai and Zhou, 2015; Weyer et al., 
2015).  
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• These IoT cyber risk vectors are not clearly visible and focus should be on the 
communications risk; whether conventional wired (broadband or IP networks) or 
wireless (W-Fi, Bluetooth and 3G/4G) – the connectivity is one of the weak spots. 
While there are many more cyber risk vectors, analysing every single risk vector was 
considered beyond the scope of this study and the focus was placed on the most prominent 
vectors as identified in the literature. The idea was to identify a risk assessment process that 
can be applied by future researchers to many different risk vectors. The IoT risk vectors 
outlined above are analysed in the following section through comparative analysis of cyber 
risk in high-tech strategies.  
4 COMPARATIVE STUDY ON IOT CYBER RISK IN HIGH-TECH STRATEGIES  
This section represents a comparative study (Ganin et al., 2017) of national high-tech 
strategies, because the IoT is strongly represented in the Industry 4.0. The selection of high-
tech strategies - sources for analysis is based on the richness of the documented processes. 
The comparative study is applied on a range of IoT high-technology strategies to enhance the 
framework and to build upon previous literature on this subject (Petar Radanliev et al., 2018). 
Defining the most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors is of crucial importance to understanding 
IoT cyber risk, because IoT cyber risk is often invisible to cyber security experts. In this 
section, the study intent is to analyse Industry 4.0 and present it as an example of how risk 
assessment takes place at the national level.  
4.1 Understanding IoT cyber risk in national high-tech strategies 
The current direction of impact assessment from IoT cyber risk, seems to be decided by 
assessment activities, e.g. workgroups (IVI, 2017) or testbeds (IIC, 2017), supported by 
economic assessments (Catapult UK, 2017). In some strategies, impact is decided by 
assessing key projects in the digital industry, e.g. Fabbrica Intelligente (MIUR, 2014) and 
Industrie 4.0 (GTAI, 2014). 
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The different approaches to impact assessment, could be resulting from the differences in IoT 
focus. The Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC, 2016, 2017) focuses on promoting core IoT 
industries; while the New France Industrial (NFI) (NIF, 2016), the High Value 
Manufacturing Catapult (HVM) (John, 2017) and the National Technology Initiative (ASI, 
2016), all focus on promoting the development of key IoT technologies. Another high-tech 
strategy, Made in China 2025 (SCPRC, 2017), promotes tech sectors, while the Made 
Different (Sirris and Agoria, 2017) promotes key IoT transformations.  
The diversity of the approaches can also be identified in the less evolved in identifying IoT 
cyber risk vectors (e.g. The Netherlands - Smart Industry (Bouws et al., 2015); Belgium - 
Made Different (Sirris and Agoria, 2017); Spain - Industrie Conectada (MEICA, 2015); Italy 
- Fabbrica Intelligente (MIUR, 2014); G20 - New Industrial Revolution (G20, 2016)). This 
could be because some high-tech strategies lack documentation and appear disorganised. 
Such arguments are present in literature (Kim, 2017).  
The Industrie 4.0 (Wahlster et al., 2013; Industrie 4.0, 2017); the report by Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) (DCMS, 2017), and the Industrial Value Chain Initiative 
(IVI) (IVI. Industrial Value Chain Initiative, 2016; IVI, 2017) promote different risk vectors 
than the Russian National Technology Initiative (NTI) (ASI, 2016).  
In some strategies, e.g. the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership (AMP, 2013), these 
differences are understandable, because one strategy would have evolved into a new high-the 
strategy, e.g. IIC (IIC, 2017), or are very narrowly focused on futuristic IoT technologies, e.g. 
New Robot Strategy (METI, 2015); Robot Revolution Initiative (METIJ, 2015); and the IoT 
technologies do not yet exist. Hence, we can only speculate on the expected cyber risks (P. 
Radanliev, C. D. De Roure, et al., 2018; P. Radanliev, D. De Roure, et al., 2018).  
The Table 1 summarises the analysis of the comparative study. The most prominent IoT 
cyber risk vectors derive from the analysis and are presented in a comparative decomposition 
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approach. The aim of the comparative analysis and decomposition is to show the IoT cyber 
risk vectors and areas not covered (gaps) in national high-tech strategies. Secondly, the 
comparative analysis and decomposition enables visualising how the areas not covered in one 
high-tech strategy, have been addressed in other high-tech strategies. Therefore, the 
comparative study enables standardisation of approaches. The Table 1 enables policy makers 
to firstly identify the gaps and secondly to identify the best approach to address individual 
risk vectors. However, the analysis in Table 1 is limited to the most prominent vectors as 
identified in existing literature previously in section 3.1.  
Most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors 
Vectors Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
Risk vectors Cloud Real-time Autonomous  Recovery  
IoT cyber risk vectors in documented and evolved high-tech strategies 
High-tech strategies     
Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
USA -  
(1) Industrial Internet 
Consortium (IIC, 2017);  
Cloud-computing 
platforms. 
Operational models 
in real time; 
Customised products 
in real time. 
Fully connected 
and automated 
production line;  
Highly 
automated 
environments.  
Disaster recovery.  
(2) Advanced Manufacturing 
Partnership (AMP, 2013). 
Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. NIST.  
UK – (1) UK Digital Strategy 
(DCMS, 2017) 
Cloud technology 
skills; 
Cloud computing 
technologies; 
Cloud data centres; 
Cloud-based 
software; 
Cloud-based 
computing; 
Cloud guidance.   
Digital real-time and 
interoperable 
records; 
Platform for real-
time information.  
 
Robotics and 
Autonomous 
Systems; 
Support for 
robotics and 
artificial 
intelligence; 
Automation of 
industrial 
processes; 
Active Cyber 
Defence. 
Not covered.  
(2) Catapults (John, 2017). Not covered. Not covered. Automation. Economic impact. 
Japan - (1) Industrial Value 
Chain Initiative (IVI, 2017); 
Cloud enabled 
monitoring; 
Integration 
framework in cloud 
computing. 
Not covered. Factory 
Automation; 
Robot Program 
Assets. 
Not covered. 
(2) New Robot Strategy 
(NRS) (METI, 2015);  
Not covered. Not covered. Robots 
innovation hub; 
Robot society; 
Robotics in IoT. 
Not covered. 
Robot Revolution Initiative 
(RRI) (METIJ, 2015). 
Society 5.0 Connected industries. IoT in robotics. Not covered. 
Germany - Industrie 4.0 
(GTAI, 2014) 
Cloud computing; 
Cloud-based 
security networks. 
  
CPS systems. 
 
Automated 
production; 
Automated 
conservation of 
recourses.  
Not covered. 
Russia - National Technology 
Initiative (NTI) (ASI, 2016). 
Not covered. Not covered. Artificial 
intelligence and 
control systems.   
Not covered. 
France - New France 
Industrial (NFI) (NIF, 2013). 
Not covered. Not covered. Automation and 
robotics 
Impact assessment.  
IoT cyber risk vectors in emerging and less evolved high-tech strategies 
Risk vectors Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
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Nederland - Smart Industry; 
or Factories of the Future 4.0 
(Bouws, et.al., 2015). 
Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. SWAT analysis 
Belgium - Made Different 
(SA, 2017). 
Not covered. CPS Not covered. Not covered. 
Spain - Industrie Conectada 
4.0 (MEICA, 2015). 
Not covered. CPS Linking the 
physical to the 
virtual to create 
intelligent 
industry 
HADA - Advanced 
Self-diagnosis tool 
Italy - Fabbrica Intelligente 
(MIUR, 2014). 
Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. 
IoT cyber risk vectors in elusive and roughly defined high-tech strategies 
Risk vectors Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
China - Made in China 2025 
(SCPRC, 2017) 
Not covered. Not covered. Automated 
machine tools 
and robotics 
Financial and fiscal 
state control 
G20 - New Industrial 
Revolution (NIR) (G20, 2016) 
Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. Not covered. 
Table 1: Analysis of IoT cyber risk vectors in high-tech national strategies 
To provide clarity on the areas not covered (gaps), the IoT cyber risk vectors are used as 
reference categories (Table 1), for decomposing the IoT cyber risk into sub-categories. The 
sub-categories are used for defining various IoT cyber risks vectors and for clarifying 
different and sometimes contrasting understanding of IoT cyber risks. The comparative study 
in Table 1, follows the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and categorises 
the areas not covered in IoT risk vectors, to construct the cyber assessment design principles. 
In the following sections, a more general assessment is being presented and the national plans 
analysed are presented in a broader sense that take in more of the landscape of IoT 
implementation. 
5 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS 
A key part of understanding the risks and issues facing the IoT involves reflecting on the 
standards and models present today. In what follows, we reflect on seven cyber risk standards 
and two cyber risk models. The design initiates with integrating best practices. Through 
empirical analysis (Davis, Garcia and Zhang, 2009), we compare existing cyber security 
measures and standards (e.g. FAIR and NIST cyber security frameworks) to propose a new 
and improved design principles for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk.  
The analysis presented in this section emerge from the analysis in this study, but also 
represent a stand-alone piece of work because the nature of security frameworks and 
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assessment tools is quite diverse. What is presented in this section is an attempt to apply 
comparative analysis to synthesize a common, best practice approach that pulls the best 
features from each of the frameworks into a single, theoretical approach. 
5.1 Empirical analysis of cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies 
A majority of the cyber security frameworks today apply qualitative approaches to measuring 
cyber risk (FIRST, no date; Caralli et al., 2007; Wynn et al., 2011; NIST, 2016; CMMI, 
2017). Some of the frameworks propose diverse qualitative methods, such as OCTAVE, 
which stands for Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (Caralli et 
al., 2007) and recommends three levels of risk (low, medium, high). Methodologies, such as 
the Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) (Wynn et al., 2011) are also 
qualitative and apply a standardised template to record system threats. There also systems 
that combine qualitative and quantitative approaches. The Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) (CVSS, 2017) provides modified base metrics for assigning metric values to 
real vulnerabilities. The CVSS applies expert’s opinions, presented as statements, where each 
statement is allocated a level of cyber risk and the calculator assesses the overall level of risk 
form all statements.  
Considering the lack of more precise methods, the modified base metrics represent the state 
of the art at present. The supply chain cyber risks are also assessed with qualitative 
approaches (Radanliev, 2014, 2015c, 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Radanliev, Rowlands and Thomas, 
2014; Petar Radanliev, Charles De Roure, et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, David C De Roure, 
et al., 2019; Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure, J. R. C. Nurse, Burnap, Anthi, et al., 
2019a; Petar Radanliev, David Charles De Roure, J. R. C. Nurse, Montalvo and Burnap, 
2019b). The Exostar system (Shaw et al., 2017), which represent a qualitative approach, 
provides guidance points for assessing the supply chain cyber risk. The overall current state 
of cyber maturity can be verified with the Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) 
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(CMMI, 2017), which integrates five levels of the original Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014). To reach the required cyber security maturity 
level, the current cyber state can be transformed into a given a target cyber state by applying 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) (NIST, 2016) cyber security 
framework implementation guidance (Barrett et al., 2017). The risk assessment approach is 
based on the framework for improving cybersecurity of critical infrastructure (NIST, 2014) 
and follows recommendations for qualitative risk assessments e.g. standards based approach, 
or internal controls approach.  
Slightly different approach to understanding risk is the use of emerging quantitative cyber 
risk models, such as the Factor Analysis of Information Risk Institute (FAIR) approach 
(FAIR, 2017a). In effect, quantitative approaches are mostly present in the cyber security 
models (FAIR, 2017b; RiskLens, 2017).  The FAIR approach is complementary to existing 
risk frameworks that are deliberately distanced from quantitative modelling (e.g. NIST) and 
applies knowledge from existing quantitative models, e.g. RiskLens (RiskLens, 2017), and 
Cyber VaR (CyVaR) (FAIR, 2017b). In a way, FAIR is complementing the work of NIST 
and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) (ISO, 2017), which is the 
international standard-setting body and includes cyber risk standards. For example, the ISO 
27032 is a framework for collaboration that provides specific recommendations for cyber 
security, and ISO 27001 sets requirements for organisations to establish an Information 
Security Management System (ISMS).  
Notable for this discussion, only ISO 27031 and NIST (NIST, 2016) provide 
recommendations for recovery planning, which some of the other frameworks and models 
have focused on less. A key point to note here is that risk estimation is used for recovery 
planning, and as such quantitative risk impact estimation (Allodi and Massacci, 2017) is 
needed for making decisions on topics such as cyber risk insurance (Öğüt, Raghunathan and 
Menon, 2011). The quantitative risk assessment approaches e.g. FAIR (FAIR, 2017a), 
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RiskLens (RiskLens, 2017), and CyVaR (FAIR, 2017b), are still be in their infancy. Hence, 
the state of the art in current risk estimation (also known as risk analysis) is based on the 
high, medium, low scales (also known as the trafic lights system or colour system). 
The diversity of approaches for cyber risk impact assessment, reemphasises the requirement 
for standardisation of cyber risk assessment approaches. The diversity and the gaps in the 
proposed approaches, become clearly visible in Table 2. This diversity presents conflict in 
risk assessment, e.g. qualitative versus quantitative. To enable the standardisation design, in 
Table 2, core cyber impact assessment concepts are extracted to defining the design 
principles for cyber risk impact assessment from IoT vectors. The design principles initiate 
with defining how to measure, standardise and compute cyber risk and how to recover. These 
are defined as:  
• Measure – calculate economic impact of cyber risk.  
• Standardise – international cyber risk assessment approach.  
• Compute – quantify cyber risk.  
• Recover – plan for impact of cyber-attacks, e.g. cyber insurance. 
Frameworks ISO NIST FAIR 
Measure ISO 27032  Categorising  Financial  
Standardise ISO 27001  Assembling Complementary  
Compute  Compliance  Compliance  Quantitative 
Recover  ISO 27031  Compliance Level of exposure 
Methodologies TARA CMMI OCTAVE 
Measure Threat Matrix Maturity models Workshops 
Standardise Template threats ISO 15504 - SPICE Repeatability 
Compute  Qualitative  Maturity levels Qualitative 
Recover  System recovery  
 
Refers to other 
standards. 
Impact areas  
Systems Exostar system CVSS calculator  
Measure ISO 27032  Base metrics  
Standardise ISO 27001  Mathematical 
approximation  
 
Compute  Compliance  Qualitative  
Recover  ISO 27031  Not included  
Models RiskLens CyVaR  
Measure BetaPERT 
distributions 
VaR  
Standardise Adopt FAIR  World Economic 
Forum 
 
Compute  Quantitative risk 
analytics with Monte 
Carlo and sensitivity 
analysis 
Quantitative risk 
analytics with Monte 
Carlo 
 
Recover  Not included Not included  
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Table 2: Empirical analysis of cyber risk frameworks, methodologies, systems and models 
Beyond these issues, the empirical research outlined in Table 2 has highlighted other 
challenges in adopting existing cyber risk frameworks for dynamic and connected systems, 
where the IoT presents great complexities. For example the increasing ability of risk to 
propogate given the high degrees of connectivity in digital, cyber-physical, and social 
systems, and challenges pertaining to the limited knowledge that risk assessors have of 
dynamic IoT systems (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017). 
6 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS TO UNCOVER THE BEST METHOD TO DEFINE 
A UNIFIED CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT 
The above empirical and comparative analysis correlated academic literature with 
government and industry cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies. In this 
section, epistemological analysis is applied to probe the existing understanding of cyber risk 
assessment. Such an approach was considered appropriate for our purposes because most 
cyber security frameworks and methodologies propose answers to a quantitative question 
with qualitative assessments. The analysis in this study examines how the current cyber risk 
assessment approaches are based on conventional abstractions, for instance, the colour coding 
in the NIST framework traffic light protocol (Johnson et al., 2016), or the mathematical 
approximation in CVSS (CVSS, 2017). In quantified cases, we may have a modified attack 
vector allocated to a numerical value of 0.85 for a network metric value, and a numerical 
value of 0.62 for adjacent network metric value (FIRST, no date). The question is why 0.85 
and why 0.62 and why red represents information not for disclosure (Johnson et al., 2016). 
These measurements represent conventional abstractions that when expressed, become 
important units of measurement. These units of measurement in effect represent symbols with 
a defined set of rules in a conventional system, where truths about their validity can be 
derived from expert opinions, hence proven to be correct. These units of measurement do not, 
University of Oxford 
 18 
however, represent quantitative units based on statistical methods for predicting uncertainty.   
   
Knowledge requires ‘truth, belief and justification’ as individual conditions (Steup, 2005). 
Knowledge that a numerical value of 0.62 is ‘true’ metric value for adjacent network, as the 
related CVSS approach ‘believes’, needs to be ‘justified’ to confirm it does not represent just 
a guess of luck. Since a numerical value. Justification needs to be based on evidentialism 
(Conee and Feldman, 2004; Mittag, 2011), where a proposition e.g. numerical value of 0.62, 
is epistemically justified as determined entirely by evidence. The debate whether cyber risk 
standards can be epistemically justified, must be based on the facts and evidence currently 
available. In evidentialism, epistemic evaluations are separate from moral believes and 
practical assessments, as epistemically justified evaluations might conflict with moral and 
practical estimations (Conee and Feldman, 2004).  
7 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The integration of the theoretical analysis, with the empirical study of existing models with 
the comparative study of national strategies leads to a new epistemological framework 
consistent of sets of techniques for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk. Subsequently, a 
grounded theory approach is applied on the results of the epistemological framework with the 
output of the case study research into IoT cyber trends and technologies. The case study 
research is not applied to identify new, or the most prominent risk vectors. It would be 
challenging to argue that there is no bias if the vectors came from a limited population of 
stakeholders. The case study research simply represents an example of how the 
epistemological framework could be applied in a step by step process. 
7.1 Proposed epistemological framework for cyber risk assessment standardisation 
To define a standardisation framework, firstly the Pugh controlled convergence (Pugh, 1991) 
is applied with a group of experts in the field. The Pugh controlled convergence is a time-
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tested method for concept selection and for validation of research design. The results from 
the comparative study and the empirical analysis were presented, including the Figure 1 and 
2, to a group of experts. The Pugh controlled convergence (Pugh, 1991) was applied to 
organise the emerging concepts into definitions of the design principles. The resulting 
definition of design principles for a standardisation framework are derived from four 
workshops that included 18 distinguished engineers from Cisco Systems, and 2 distinguished 
engineers from Fujitsu. The workshops with Cisco Systems were conducted in the USA in 
four different Cisco research centres. The Fujitsu workshop was conducted separately to 
avoid those experts being influenced or outspoken by the larger goup from Cisco systems.  
This approach to pursuing validity follows existing literature on this topics (Eggenschwiler, 
Agrafiotis and Nurse, 2016; Axon et al., 2018) and provides clear definitions that specify the 
units of analysis for IoT cyber risk vectors. The reason for pursuing clarity on the units of 
analysis for IoT cyber risk, was justified by existing literature, where these are identified as 
recommended areas for further research (de Reuver, Sørensen and Basole, 2017). The IoT 
risk units of analysis from individual high-tech strategy are combined into standardisation 
vectors. The process of defining the standardisation vectors followed the Pugh controlled 
convergence method, where experts were asked to confirm the valid concept, merge 
duplicated concepts, and delete conflicting concepts.  
In the assessment and transcription process, discourse analysis is applied to interpret the data 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008) and for recognising the most profound concepts in the data 
(Goulding, 2002). The findings from the workshops are summarised in the table below (Table 
3). The findings are presented in Table 3 after the controlled convergence was performed on 
all five workshops. The controlled convergence resulted with some units of analysis being 
merged to avoid duplication, such as Cloud-based computing (DCMS, 2017); and Cloud 
computing (Wahlster et al., 2013). Or the concepts of CPS, which was identified as vector 2 
in multiple high-tech strategies (Wahlster et al., 2013; MEICA, 2015; Sirris and Agoria, 
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2017). Similarly, the units of analysis of cyber risk standards are presented as merged 
definitions of the design principles, as categorised on the controlled convergence workshops.    
The Table 3 below presents an epistemological framework of the knowledge and 
understanding, gathered from the comparative empirical analysis. The epistemological 
framework in Table 3 presents a narrowed framework of current understanding of IoT cyber 
risk, which is analysed and verified with the Pugh controlled convergence method for 
concept selection and for validation of research design. 
IoT cyber risk 
Cyber risk vectors Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
Cloud Real-time Autonomous  Recovery  
Vector units of analysis Cloud-computing 
platforms; technology 
skills; 
data centres; 
software; 
guidance;  
monitoring; 
Integration in cloud 
computing;  
Society 5.0;  
security networks. 
Operational models in 
real time; 
Customised products in 
real time;  
Digital real-time and 
interoperable records; 
Platform for real-time 
information;  
Connected industries;  
CPS.  
Automated environments;  
Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems; 
Robotics and artificial 
intelligence; 
Active cyber defence;  
Robots innovation; Robot 
society; Robotics in IoT;  
Artificial intelligence and 
control systems. 
Economic impact; Impact 
assessment; SWAT 
analysis; HADA - 
Advanced self-diagnosis 
tool; Financial and fiscal 
state control. 
Standardisation framework for cyber risk assessment  
Measure ISO 27032; Categorising; Financial; Threat Matrix; Maturity models; Workshops; ISO 27032; Base metrics; 
BetaPERT distributions; VaR 
Standardise ISO 27001; Assembling; Complementary; Template threats; ISO 15504 – SPICE; Repeatability; ISO 27001; 
Mathematical approximation; Adopt FAIR; World Economic Forum 
Compute  Compliance; Quantitative; Maturity levels; Qualitative; Quantitative risk analytics with Monte Carlo and 
sensitivity analysis. 
Recover  ISO 27031; Compliance; Level of exposure; System recovery; Impact areas. 
Table 3: Epistemological framework for standardisation of cyber risk impact assessment  
The epistemological framework in Table 3 defines the IoT cyber risk vectors and relates the 
risk vectors with units of analysis. Defining the IoT cyber risk vectors and the related units of 
analysis, represents a crucial milestone in defining the design principles for cyber risk 
assessment of IoT. The epistemological framework in Table 3 proposes the design principles 
for measuring, standardising, computing and recovering from IoT risk. An example of how 
the epistemological framework in Table 3 can be applied:  
• Measure the ‘vector 3’: economic impact of cyber risk from autonomous ‘robotics in 
IoT’ – calculate economic impact of cyber risk with ‘BetaPERT distributions’.  
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• Standardise the ‘vector 3’ – international cyber risk impact from autonomous ‘robotics 
in IoT’ - assessment approach with ‘Mathematical approximation’.  
• Compute the impact from ‘vector 3’: economic impact of cyber risk from autonomous 
‘robotics in IoT’– quantify cyber risk with ‘Quantitative risk analytics with Monte 
Carlo and sensitivity analysis’.  
• Recovery planning for the ‘vector 3’: calculate financial cost from cyber risk from 
autonomous ‘robotics in IoT’ and determine maximum acceptable ‘level of exposure’ 
for ‘system recovery’ – plan for cyber insurance for the determined ‘level of exposure’. 
This example covers only one risk vector and one unit of analysis. The example is 
appropriate for an enterprise that aims to deploy autonomous robotics in IoT. National high-
tech strategies would need to perform all analysis, for all risk vectors, with all units of 
analysis provided in the epistemological framework in Table 3. It is surprising that national 
high-tech strategies have not until present performed such analysis. Especially concerning are 
the findings from the gap analysis in Table 1 which confirms that many of the areas covered 
by the epistemological framework in Table 3 are not covered in some of the national high-
tech national strategies. An example of how such analysis could be performed in provided in 
Figure 1 below. This design process follows recommendations from literature (Strader, Lin 
and Shaw, 1999), and shows how individual cyber risk components can be integrated into an 
impact assessment standardisation infrastructure. The epistemological framework is 
promoting the development of a generally accepted cyber security approach. This is also 
called for in current research work (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017; P. Radanliev, C. D. 
De Roure, et al., 2018; P. Radanliev, D. De Roure, et al., 2018), because the IoT adoption 
requires standardisation reference architecture (Ahmed, Kim and Kim, 2013; Wahlster et al., 
2013; Weyer et al., 2015; Stock and Seliger, 2016) to encompass security and privacy (Zhu, 
Rieger and Basar, 2011). 
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7.2 Defining the design principles for cyber risk assessment of IoT vectors 
In the section above, we propose a new set of design principles for assessing the cyber risk 
from IoT risk vectors. The principles had been tested through workshops and a comparative 
study to ensure the process can be applied in real-world practice. The comparative study 
shows that IoT trends have failed to implement the recovery planning. This is in contradiction 
with the findings from the second reflection of the empirical study of cyber risk assessment 
standards, where the recovery planning is strongly emphasised (see: ISO, FAIR, NIST, 
OCTAVE, TARA). It seems that the IoT high-tech strategies may have overlooked the 
recommendations from the cyber risk assessment standards. A standardisation approach for 
IoT impact assessment should firstly consider the new IoT cyber risk vectors derived from 
the comparative study. Secondly, a standardisation approach should consider the 
recommendations from the empirical study. The empirical study recommends a 
decomposition process of assessment standards, conducting grounded theory analysis. This 
was followed by a compounding of concepts to address individual gaps in cyber risk 
assessment standards.  
The empirical and comparative study investigated the soundness of current cyber risk 
assessments. The theoretical analysis however, was applied to probe the soundness of the 
qualitative versus quantitative assessment approaches. Theoretical analysis confirmed that to 
identify the cost of recovery planning and/or the cost of cyber insurance, a new quantitative 
model is needed that would anticipate IoT risks. The empirical study analysed the leading 
quantitative cyber risk models (RiskLens, supported by FAIR; and CyVaR, supported by the 
World Economic Forum, Deloitte and FAIR). The unifying link between the two cyber risk 
models was identified as the application of Monte Carlo simulations, for predicting cyber risk 
uncertainty.  A new impact assessment model for the IoT risk vectors, should implement the 
guidance from RiskLense and CyVaR. The main guidance is that the application of Monte 
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Carlo simulation would reduce the IoT cyber risk uncertainty and enable the approximation 
and estimation of the economic impact of cyber risk from IoT devices. Such calculation 
would enable companies to develop appropriate recovery planning and the insurance industry 
to provide a more realistic cost of cyber insurance.  
 
Figure 1: Design principles for assessing IoT cyber risks vectors in national strategies 
At a higher analytical level, in Figure 1 we propose a new set of design principles for 
assessing the cyber risk from IoT risk vectors. The comparative study of IoT in national high-
tech strategies shows that I4.0 trends have failed to implement the recovery planning in the 
leading national initiatives. This is in contradiction with the findings from the second 
reflection from the empirical study of the leading cyber risk frameworks, where the recovery 
planning is strongly emphasised (ISO, FAIR, NIST, Octave, TARA). It seems that the 
leading high-tech strategies initiatives have ignored the recommendations from the world 
leading cyber risk frameworks. A new model for IoT risk impact assessment should firstly 
consider the findings from the comparative study of I4.0 trends, secondly the 
recommendations from the empirical study of leading cyber risk frameworks. To identify the 
cost of recovery planning or the cost of cyber insurance, a new quantitative model is needed 
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that would be applicable to IoT cyber risks. There are currently two leading quantitative 
cyber risk models. First is the RiskLens approach, promoted by FAIR.  Second is the Cyber 
VaR, promoted by the World Economic Forum, Deloitte and more recently by FAIR. The 
unifying link between the two cyber risk models is the application of Monte Carlo 
simulations for predicting cyber risk uncertainty. From this study, it appears that a new 
impact assessment model for the cyber risks from IoT in high-tech national strategies, should 
start with the guidance from RiskLense and Cyber VaR.  The application of Monte Carlo 
simulation would reduce the IoT cyber risk uncertainty and enable the approximation and 
estimation of the economic impact of cyber risk from IoT devices. Such calculation would 
enable companies to develop appropriate recovery planning and the insurance industry to 
provide a more realistic cost of cyber insurance.  
The proposed design principles suggest anticipating recovery planning in the assessment of 
economic impact of IoT cyber risk. Such approach would enable cyber insurance companies 
to value the impact of IoT cyber risks in I4.0. The rationale of the proposed design principles 
is that without appropriate recovery planning, the economic impact can be miscalculated, 
resulting in greater losses than we anticipated initially. The design principles are developed to 
advance the existing efforts (from the World Economic Forum, Deloitte, FAIR, etc) in 
developing a standardised quantitative approach for assessing the impact of cyber risks. The 
described design process decomposes the most prominent risk vectors and units of analysis 
and formulates a generalised set of IoT risk vectors. This does not refer to a complete set of 
vectors, but to the most prominent risk vectors. Considering that such study has not been 
conducted until present, the process of integrating the most prominent vectors, with a 
comparative analysis of the a diverse set of security frameworks and tools, represents the first 
step in understanding the standardisation process. The design principles in Figure 1, also 
present multiple approaches to calculating the economic risk of IoT implementation (e.g. 
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BetaPert, Cyber VaR, RiskLense). This connects the design with the described issues related 
to the costs of risk.   
7.3 Discussion   
The research problem investigated in this article was the present lack of standardised 
methodology that would measure the cost and probabilities of cyber-attacks in specific IoT 
related verticals (ex. connected spaces or commercial and industrial IoT equipment) and the 
economic impact (IoT product, service or platform related) of such cyber risk.  
The lack of recovery planning is consistent in all of the high-tech strategies reviewed. Adding 
to this, the new risks emerging from IoT connected devices and services, and the lack of 
economic impact assessments from IoT cyber risks, makes it imperative to emphasise the 
lack of recovery planning. The volume of data generated by the IoT devices creates diverse 
challenges in variety of verticals (e.g. machine learning, ethics, business models). 
Simultaneously, to design and build cyber security architecture for complex coupled IoT 
systems, while understanding the economic impact, demands bold new solutions for 
optimisation and decision making (Nurse, Creese and De Roure, 2017). Much of the research 
is application-oriented and by default interdisciplinary, requiring hybrid research in different 
academic areas. Hybrid and interdisciplinary approaches are required, for the design of cyber 
risk assessment that integrate economic impact from IoT verticals. Such design must meet 
public acceptability, security standards, and legal scrutiny.   
As a result of the fast growth of the IoT, cyber risk finance and insurance markets are lacking 
empirical data to construct actuarial tables. Despite the development of models related to the 
impact of cyber risk, there is a lack of such models related to specific IoT verticals. Hence, 
banks and insurers are unable to price IoT cyber risk with the same precision as in traditional 
insurance lines. Even more concerning, the current macroeconomic costs estimates of cyber-
attacks related to IoT products, services and platforms are entirely speculative. The approach 
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by ‘early adopters’ that IoT products are ‘secure by default’ is misleading. Even governments 
advocate security standards ex. standards like ISA 99, or C2M2 (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2014, 2015) that accept that the truth on the ground is that IoT devices are unable to secure 
themselves, so the logical placement of security capability is in the communications network.  
8 CONCLUSION  
This article decomposes the cyber risk assessment standards and combines concepts for the 
purposes of building a model for the standardisation of impact assessment approaches. The 
model enables the implementation of two current problems with assessing cyber risk from 
IoT devices. First, the model enables identifying and capturing the IoT cyber risk from 
different risk vectors. Second, the model offers new design principles for assessing cyber 
risk. The analysis in this paper was focused on understanding the best approach for 
quantifying the impact of cyber risk in the IoT space. The model and the documented process 
represents a new design for mapping IoT risk vectors and optimising IoT risk impact 
assessment.  
The model proposes a process for adapting existing cyber security practices and standards to 
include IoT cyber risk. Despite the interest to standardise existing cyber risk frameworks, 
models and methodologies, this has not been done until present. Standardisation framework 
currently does not exist in literature and the epistemological framework represents the first 
attempt to define the standardisation process for cyber risk impact assessment of IoT vectors. 
This article applies empirical (via literature reviews and workshops) and comparative studies 
with theoretical analysis and the grounded theory to define a process of standardisation of 
cyber risk impact assessment approaches. The study advances the efforts of integrating 
standards and governance on IoT cyber risk and offers a better understanding of a holistic 
impact assessment approach for cyber risk. The documented process represents a new design 
for mapping and optimising IoT cyber security. 
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The empirical study defined the gaps in current cyber risk assessment frameworks, models 
and methodologies. The identified gaps are analysed to define a process of decomposing risks 
and compounding assessment concepts, to address the gaps in cyber risk standards. The 
comparative study defines the IoT cyber risk vectors which are not anticipated or considered 
in existing cyber risk assessment standards. The epistemological analysis adapts the current 
cyber security standards and defines the principles for integrating specific IoT risk vectors in 
a holistic impact assessment framework. It is anticipated that the analysis of the complete 
economic impact of data compromise of IoT risk vectors, would empower the 
communications network providers to create clear, rigorous, industry-accepted mechanisms 
to measure, control, analyse, distribute and manage critical data needed to develop, deploy 
and operate cost-effective cyber security for critical infrastructure. The research design 
identifies and captures the IoT cyber risk vectors and defines a framework for adapting 
existing cyber risk standards to include IoT cyber risk.  
8.1 Limitations and further research  
The epistemological framework in this article is derived from empirical and comparative 
studies, supported with theoretical analysis of a limited set of frameworks, models, 
methodologies and high-tech strategies. The set selection was based on documented 
availability and on relevance to cyber risk impact assessment of IoT risk vectors. Holistic 
analysis of all risk assessment approaches was considered beyond the scope of this study. 
Additional research is required to integrate the knowledge from other studies. 
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